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The rule of law is undermined when political and personal interests motivate
criminal prosecutions. This report advances proposals for ensuring that the
federal criminal justice system is administered uniformly based on the facts and
the law. It recommends a law preventing the president from interfering in specific
prosecutions, another law establishing responsibilities for prosecutors who
receive improper orders, and new conflict of interest regulations for Department
of Justice officials.
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by
students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, which
is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available
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Executive Summary
The Department of Justice is not sufficiently insulated from
political interference. Political intrusion on prosecutorial
decision-making undermines independence in criminal law
enforcement, the principle of the rule of law, and public
confidence in our legal system. These values are at the core
of our system of government. This report outlines a range of
reforms to ensure that specific prosecutions are not unduly
impacted by political considerations.
Even before President Trump faced accusations of obstructing
the Department of Justice’s investigation into his campaign’s
ties to Russia, other presidents improperly interfered with DOJ
investigations and prosecutions. Questions about the degree
to which the president may control the federal criminal law
enforcement process reach back to the nation’s earliest years.
Orders from Presidents George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson relating to certain criminal matters did not engender
any controversy, but only decades later some attorneys general
began asserting that prosecutors were independent actors
whose primary obligation was to the law, not presidential
directives. Congress created the modern DOJ in 1870, and
norms and regulations have since developed to protect its
independence, including policies to regulate communications
between the White House and DOJ.
Perhaps the most notable example of presidential interference
with the Department of Justice came during the Watergate
scandal in the early 1970s when President Richard Nixon fired
the special prosecutor investigating Nixon’s 1972 presidential
campaign. Nixon dismissed the special prosecutor after he
subpoenaed tapes of Oval Office conversations.
In 2006, President George W. Bush’s administration faced
criticism that it dismissed seven U.S. attorneys for pursuing
cases that did not advance the administration’s agenda.
The DOJ’s independent watchdog concluded “there was
significant evidence that political partisan considerations”
impacted the firings.
Following the Watergate and Bush-era incidents, reform
proposals called for additional measures to insulate the DOJ
from political interference. Senator Sam Ervin, who chaired the
committee that investigated Watergate, proposed legislation
that would have limited the president’s ability to remove the
attorney general by establishing a six-year term for the position.
But the idea encountered substantial resistance, largely
on the basis that it would separate law enforcement from
democratic accountability. More recently, some scholars have
proposed electing the attorney general. The 2006 U.S. attorney
dismissals prompted Congress to consider legislation to codify
regulations of White House-DOJ communications.

Limitations on the president’s control over the DOJ find support
in the Constitution and principles that undergird that legal
system. The Constitution’s framers intended for the president
to execute the laws in a manner consistent with the nation’s
interests—not his political or personal interests. They also
subjected the president’s powers to restrictions imposed by
Congress. These principles are embodied in the Take Care
Clause, which demands that the president “faithfully” executive
the law, and the Executive Vesting Clause, which grants the
president powers to carry out the responsibilities of his office.
Additionally, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress
discretion to determine how the federal government’s powers
are exercised.
Other checks on the president’s authority over the DOJ flow
from prosecutors’ obligations. Prosecutors must follow the law
over the president’s orders when the two come into conflict.
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors act as agents
of the law—not of the president—when they act pursuant to
authority Congress granted them, such as deciding whether
to bring charges based on a criminal statute. Prosecutors have
a quasi-judicial role, which means they must follow fair and
neutral procedures. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held
that they have an obligation to act in the public interest.
We recommend three reforms to prevent the president and
other White House officials from interfering in the neutral
administration of the federal criminal justice system. Proposal
1 calls for legislation prohibiting the president and other White
House personnel from influencing decisions related to the
investigation or prosecution of any individual, except where
a core executive function, such as defending against national
security threats, is implicated. Because Congress granted
the executive branch authority to handle prosecutions, it can
regulate how that power is exercised. The proposed legislation
would preserve the president’s discretion to set general law
enforcement priorities.
Proposal 2 aims to prohibit prosecutors from acting on
improper directives from the White House. The first aspect
of this proposal is a law codifying the guidelines in the DOJ’s
Justice Manual that instruct prosecutors on conducting
investigations and prosecutions. The guidelines emphasize
prosecutors’ quasi-judicial role and their responsibility to
neutrally seek justice. In addition to emphasizing prosecutors’
responsibilities, codification of the guidelines could provide legal
recourse to parties whose rights are violated by prosecutors
pursuing political aims. The second aspect of Proposal 2 calls
for legislation stating that prosecutors have a duty to not resign
in the face of improper orders. Rather, prosecutors should
Democracy Clinic
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decline to take the improper action and report the directive to
the DOJ’s Inspector General.
Proposal 3 recommends allowing the Office of Government
Ethics to use rulemaking and case-by-case adjudication
to gradually establish non-financial guidelines for when
prosecutors should recuse themselves from certain matters.
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The OGE should have the authority to determine when
prosecutors’ non-financial interests pose a “significant risk” to
the public interest such that recusal is required. The standard
for what constitutes a “significant risk” would be determined
over time through reference to the office’s case-by-case
determinations.

Introduction
President Donald Trump’s attempts to influence the
investigation of his campaign’s ties to Russia1 and his related
assertion that he has “absolute” control over the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”)2 have renewed questions about the degree
to which the president can control the enforcement of criminal
law. Similar questions have existed since George Washington’s
presidency. This report draws on history, case law, and ethical
obligations to demonstrate why Trump’s assertion that he
has an absolute right to control DOJ investigations is wrong.
The report then sets forth three proposals to strengthen the
independent enforcement of criminal law at the federal level.
The United States Constitution reflects a set of carefully
considered judgments about the allocation of institutional
authority within the federal government. The framers provided
for a diffuse power distribution among the three branches of
government. The Constitution places some powers within the
exclusive domain of one branch, while other powers, such as the
War Powers, were to be shared among the branches. However,
concerns exist that the framers’ design has failed to prevent,
and perhaps facilitated, the occurrence of their greatest fear: the
concentration of governmental power in the executive branch.
Actions and statements by President Trump3 have caused legal
scholars and lawmakers to once again evaluate whether the DOJ
is sufficiently insulated from political interference.4 The DOJ’s
ability to function within the constitutional framework
established by the framers is premised on a belief that decisions
related to criminal law enforcement are based on fact and law.5
1

See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, SPECIAL COUNSEL’S OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
4 (2019); Mark Mazzetti et al., Intimidation, Pressure and Humiliation: Inside
Trump’s Two-Year War on the Investigations Encircling Him, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/trumpinvestigations.html.

2

See Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes
U.S. ‘Look Very Bad’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-china-north-korea.html.

3

Id; see generally MUELLER, supra note 1.

4

See PROTECT DEMOCRACY, No “Absolute Right” to Control DOJ: Constitutional Limits
on White House Interference with Law Enforcement Matters (March 2018),
https://protectdemocracy.org/resource-library/document/no-absoluteright-control-doj/; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can The President
Control The Department Of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018) [hereinafter
Can The President Control]; Andrew McCanse Wright, Justice Department
Independence and White House Control 27-28 (Feb. 18, 2018), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3125848; Jed Shugerman, Think Matthew Whitaker
is a hack? He’s one of many, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/think-matthew-whitaker-is-a-hack-hes-oneof-many/2018/11/16/5efbf47c-e8f7-11e8-b8dc-66cca409c180_story.html.

5

See Erik Larson, Sally Yates Calls Trump’s Attempt to Undermine Faith in
Institutions ‘Dangerous’, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-11-28/trump-s-bid-to-sap-faith-in-institutionsdangerous-yates-says (quoting Sally Yates, “The Department of Justice
really can only function if the citizens of this country respect and believe
that decisions are being based on the facts and the law and nothing else.”).

Respecting facts and the law is essential to preventing the
exercise of government power for political purposes.6
Increasingly, however, partisanship and ideology challenge the
norm of DOJ independence and the rule of law narrative that
underlies support for the institution.7 If fact and law are
displaced by political whims as the basis for DOJ decision
making, the corresponding loss of faith in the rule of law
principles will undermine the entirety of American democracy.8
To strengthen DOJ independence, principles of rule of law, and
American democracy, this report brings to light the deficiencies
and misunderstandings with respect to presidential control of
the DOJ. This report also sets forth reforms aimed at curtailing
the subtle, as well as brazen, abuses of DOJ power that have
become increasingly common. Such abuses can undermine
the values of independence in criminal law enforcement,9 the
principle of the rule of law,10 and public confidence in our legal
system.11
This report is divided into three parts. Part I briefly describes the
history of the Department of Justice, including past instances of
presidential interference with criminal prosecution, and outlines
significant past reform proposals to prevent improper political
interference. Part II provides a framework for understanding
the functions of the presidency and how those functions relate
to other provisions of the Constitution. Part III then proposes
a series of reforms. These proposals focus on prohibiting the
president from interfering with DOJ processes; making it clear
that prosecutors who receive improper orders must not resign
and must report the improper command to the DOJ’s inspector
general; and gradually defining non-financial recusal guidelines
for prosecutors. All three of these proposals have a narrow
exception permitting limited presidential oversight on individual
prosecutions that implicate core executive functions, including
protecting the security of the United States from domestic and
foreign threats.
6

See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187,
2193 (2018).

7

See id. at 2240.

8

See id.

9

MUELLER, supra note 1, at 112; see Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman,
Trump Wanted to Order Justice Dept. to Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/
president-trump-justice-department.html (noting that Trump’s attempt to
prosecute his political adversaries served as a “blatant” example of “how
Mr. Trump views the typically independent Justice Department as a tool to
be wielded against his political enemies”).

10 See id. (noting that “Presidential meddling [in criminal cases] could
undermine the legitimacy of prosecutions by attaching political overtones
to investigations in which career law enforcement officials followed the
evidence and the law.”).
11

See id.
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I. DOJ History, Presidential Interference, and
Previous Reform Proposals
The Justice Department’s structure and its approach to criminal
prosecutions have evolved in significant ways over the course of
the nation’s history. Notable proposals for further change have
come mostly in response to instances where presidents and
politics improperly impacted law enforcement.

A. Debate Over the Relationship Between
the President and DOJ
The early relationship between the president and federal
prosecutors is the subject of debate in the legal community.
As Griffith Bell, attorney general under President Jimmy Carter,
noted, “From the inception of the Office of the Attorney General
. . . there has been ambiguity about the role, and disagreement
about the independence, of the Attorney General.”12 Some
scholars, including Kate Andrias13 and Sai Prakash,14 identify
particular historical interventions by presidents in federal
prosecutions to support an unbounded conception of executive
power over law enforcement.15 Others contend that the lack of a
centralized agency for the nation’s first 100 years supports a
more limited conception of authority.16 For example, Bruce
Green17 and Rebecca Roiphe18 suggest “rather than possessing
plenary authority over criminal prosecution, presidents could
supersede ordinary prosecutorial independence only in cases
where enumerated presidential powers were implicated.”19
Eric Posner,20 in testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, identified two reasons “[t]he founders never
believed that the president should be given ‘complete control’

12 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1065
(1978).
13 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
14 James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Paul G. Mahoney
Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
15 Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031
(2013); Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L. J. 541 (1994).
16 William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 490-94 (1989); Lawrence Lessig
& Cass Sunstein, The President and The Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
14-22 (1994).
17 Louis Stein Chair of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
18 Professor of Law, New York Law School.
19 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 15.
20 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law
School.
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over law enforcement.”21 The first reason Posner identified is the
scattering of federal law enforcement “among many different
agents, including federal officers who were not directly
controlled by the president, state officials, and private
citizens.”22 Second, Posner identified provisions of the
Constitution that do not support total control over law
enforcement, including: “involving the Senate in appointments;
giving budgetary authority to Congress, which it can use to
influence law-enforcement priorities; and allowing Congress to
define executive-branch offices.”23 The lack of clarity
surrounding the permissible limits of presidential influence of
DOJ activities has led to concerns about the permissible scope
of presidential involvement in criminal prosecutions of specific
individuals.

B. History of the DOJ
The modern Department of Justice did not come into existence
until nearly a century after the nation’s founding, when a far less
centralized approach to criminal prosecutions was abandoned.

1. Attorney General in the Early Republic
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Office of the Attorney
General as a largely judicial office with a far more limited
mandate than the modern DOJ. Initially, the attorney general
had only two duties: representing the United States as a party
before the Supreme Court and answering legal questions
submitted by the president or the heads of executive
departments.24 The Judiciary Act vested authority to prosecute
suits on behalf of the United States in “[p]erson[s] learned in
the law [appointed] to act as attorney for the United States”
in each judicial district.25 These positions were precursors of
the modern U.S. attorneys but were not subject to attorney
21 Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Eric Posner, Professor of
Law, University of Chicago), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/09-26-17%20Posner%20Testimony.pdf. Similarly, Protect Democracy,
a non-partisan nonprofit formed to hold the executive branch accountable
to law and longstanding democratic practice, also notes that “[i]ncluding
the Opinions Clause would have made little sense if the Framers meant to
grant the President full authority to reach into the Departments to direct
their activities.” See PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 13.
22 Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers, supra note 21.
23 Id.
24 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 35, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
25 Id. During this period, private citizens and state officials were also
empowered to enforce federal law in court. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 16, at 19 n. 76, 77 and accompanying text.

general control until 1861.26 Congress likely neglected to provide
a process for appointing the attorney general and district
attorneys with the expectation that the appointment power
would fall to the president as a result of the statute’s silence on
the point.
Presidential involvement in individual prosecutions was largely
non-controversial in the early days of the Republic. For example,
between 1792 and 1793, President George Washington
ordered the prosecution of Whiskey Rebellion participants.
Concluding that two defendants were wrongly accused,
Washington ordered William Rawle, the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Pennsylvania, to drop the prosecutions.27 President
Thomas Jefferson, who considered the Sedition Act of 1789
to be unconstitutional, also ordered pending prosecutions
under its provisions to be dismissed.28 Nevertheless, Jefferson
simultaneously ordered a new prosecution against one of the
defendants on alternative grounds to placate the Senate, which
had sought the indictment.29 In a letter, Jefferson laid out his
justification for the prosecution:
The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an
offence then to be prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into
a train which is not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued
and put into a legal train . . . There appears to be no weak part
in any of these positions or inferences.30

In 1831, while serving as President Andrew Jackson’s attorney
general, future Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concluded that
Jackson possessed authority to direct a federal district
attorney to dismiss a forfeiture action and to return the jewels
in question to the foreign royalty from whom they had been
stolen.31 But he noted:

26 Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 285. Previous suggestions to create
attorney general supervision existed. For example, President Washington
submitted a recommendation by Edmund Randolph to subject district
attorneys to attorney general supervision in 1791 that was never enacted.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 53, 289, 329-30 (1791). Similar recommendations by
Presidents Jackson and Polk were rejected in 1830 and 1845. Andrew
Jackson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1830), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1908, at 500, 527-28 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1908); HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 147-48 (1937).
27 Sai Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1738 (2005).
28 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas
(June 13, 1809), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-01-02-0223; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward
Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-35-02-0451.
29 Prakash, supra note 27, at 1746.

The district attorney might refuse to obey the President’s
order; and if he did refuse, the prosecution, while he remained
in office, would still go on; because the President himself
could give no order to the court or to the clerk to make any
particular entry. He could only act through his subordinate
officer, the district attorney, who is responsible to him and
who holds his office at his pleasure. And if that officer still
continues a prosecution which the President is satisfied ought
not to continue, the removal of the disobedient officer and the
substitution of one more worthy in his place would enable the
President through him faithfully to execute the law.32

By the 1850s, the nature of the Office of the Attorney General
began to transform. President Franklin Pierce’s attorney
general, Caleb Cushing, is credited as the first attorney general
to recognize the evolution of the Office of Attorney General
from an “quasi-judicial” office to an executive department. In
an opinion, he acknowledged that “a sense of subordination
has come to exist . . . with regard to the directory power of the
President.”33 However, subsequent attorneys general, such as
Edward Bates, who served under President Abraham Lincoln,
did not view this subordination as absolute. Bates noted in his
diary that the position was not “properly political, but strictly
legal; and it [was his] duty above all other ministers of State to
uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever
quarter, of mere will and power.”34

2. The Birth of the Modern DOJ
The motives behind the creation of the modern DOJ in 187035
are not clear. Robert Kaczoworski36 theorizes that the modern
DOJ was created to help address the “workload crisis” from
a “mushroom[ing]” post-Civil War federal court caseload,
which necessitated the hiring of expensive private attorneys.37
Alternatively, Norm Spaulding,38 hypothesizes that the creation
of the DOJ was intended to help enforce former slaves’ civil
32 The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831).
33 CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 50 n. 16 (1992); Henry Barrett Learned, The AttorneyGeneral and the Cabinet, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 444, 458 (1909). See 6 Op. Att’y
Gen. 326, 332-33, 340-41 (1854) (stating the duties of the Office of the
Attorney General following his first year in the role). “Cushing’s exhaustive
analysis of the origin and duties of his position has been accepted by
the later incumbents as constituting the authoritative statement on the
subject.” 2 CLAUDE M. FUESS, LIFE OF CALEB CUSHING 182 (1923).
34 THE DIARY OF EDWARD BATES, 1859-1866, at 350 (Howard K. Beale, ed.).
35 Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
36 Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.

30 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, supra note 28.

37 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTs, 1866-1876 39-40 (2005).

31 Andrias, supra note 15, at 1051-53.

38 Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
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rights during Reconstruction.39 Jed Shugerman’s view differs
from Kaczorowski and Spaulding’s conceptions. Shugerman
instead suggests the modern DOJ was part of budget-cutting
and anti-patronage retrenchment “to shrink and professionalize
the federal government” and was a first step in “the rise of
bureaucratic autonomy and expertise.”40 This theory presents
the creation of the modern DOJ as a “structural reform aiming
to protect professional independence and separate law from
politics.”41
However, Shugerman characterizes this structural reform and
consolidation as a “false start towards independence.”42 Even
after the purported centralization of prosecutions, Congress
continued to grant independent litigation authority to other
agencies, including the Department of the Interior and Post
Office Department in 1872,43 the Department of Agriculture
in 1889,44 and the Department of Labor and the Department
of Commerce in 1913.45 In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson
formally consolidated legal work within the DOJ,46 but Congress
still granted agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, independent representation authority.47 Therefore,
in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 6166 which required, except as otherwise authorized by
statute, that all claims brought by or against the United States
be litigated by DOJ.48 Congress enacted legislation in 1966 to
codify Executive Order 6166.49

C. Examples of Presidential Interference
One of the most infamous cases of presidential interference
with the DOJ occurred during the Nixon administration.

During the Watergate scandal,50 the appointed special
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was empowered to investigate “all
offenses arising out of the 1972 election.”51 Cox was granted
sole discretion to decide “whether and to what extent he
[would] inform or consult with the attorney general” on the
investigation.52 Cox subpoenaed secretly recorded tapes from
the White House, leading President Richard Nixon to order
Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox.53 This began
a chain reaction known as “The Saturday Night Massacre.”54
Richardson refused the order and resigned.55 Nixon then
ordered Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to fire
Cox. Ruckelshaus also refused and resigned.56 Finally, Solicitor
General Robert Bork, the third-ranking DOJ official, became
acting attorney general and fired Cox.57 Years later, Richardson
and Ruckelshaus admitted that they urged Bork not to resign
out of concern for DOJ continuity and fear that the chain
reaction of resignations could end up with the “messenger
service as Acting Attorney General.”58
Allegations of improper White House interference also engulfed
President George W. Bush’s administration. On December 7,
2006, the DOJ ordered the dismissal of seven U.S. attorneys,59
a move considered atypical in the middle of a president’s
term.60 In an op-ed published in USA Today, Attorney General
50 The Watergate scandal began when men associated with the reelection
campaign of President Nixon were caught breaking in to the Democratic
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate building complex
in Washington, DC. “Watergate” also now refers to various illegal and
clandestine activities undertaken by the administration against political
opponents spurring congressional inquiry and eventually the resignation of
President Nixon prior to impeachment.
51 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (June 4, 1973).
52 Id.

39 Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department
of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 438 (2011).
40 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice:
Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121,
121-25 (2014).
41 Id. at 126.
42 Id. at 170 (noting that “[b]efore and after the passage of the DOJ Act,
principal law officers were still protected by the Tenure of Office Act. It
was no easier for the President to direct the far-flung U.S. Attorneys, and
in reality, it was no easier for the President to direct other law officers who
were still dispersed around Washington.”).
43 Act of February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 432; Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 284.
44 Act of Feb. 9, 1889, 25 Stat. 659.
45 Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 141, 37 Stat. 736.
46 Exec. Order No. 2,877 (1918).
47 Transportation Act of 1920 § 3, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 92.
48 President Roosevelt acted pursuant to the provisions of the Economy Act of
1932. 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2016).
49 Act of Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 613 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 516).
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53 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A1.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate
Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/
us/new-views-emerge-of-bork-s-role-in-watergate-dismissals.html.
59 It was later discovered that two additional U.S. attorneys were
earlier relieved of their posts earlier under similarly controversial
circumstances. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF
PROF. RESP., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN
2006 14 (Sept. 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opr/
legacy/2008/09/30/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf.
60 The request for resignation and termination of U.S. attorneys at the
beginning of a president’s tenure is the norm. See Leon Neyfakh, Yes, Trump
and Sessions Just Cleaned House at the DOJ. No, It’s Not Shocking, SLATE (Mar.
10, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/46-u-sattorneys-are-asked-to-resign-as-trump-and-sessions-clean-house.html.

Alberto Gonzalez61 contended that the dismissals were due to
“performance, not to politics” and “reasons related to policy,
priorities and management.”62 However, members of Congress
suggested that the seven U.S. attorneys were terminated for
pursuing cases that did not advance Bush’s agenda.63
The dismissed U.S. attorneys were succeeded by interim
replacements who were eligible to serve without Senate
confirmation for an indefinite period because of a recent
legal change. Previously, the appointment of an interim U.S.
attorney expired after 120 days.64 This move was attacked
both as a Republican Party attempt to advance the careers of
rising conservatives65 and as an attempt to thwart meaningful
congressional participation in appointment decisions. These
allegations led to congressional,66 departmental, and criminal67
inquiries into whether the removals were intended to influence
particular prosecutions. As part of these inquiries, the DOJ
Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility,68
completed a report in September 2008 that found the
White House was involved in more than “merely approving”
some of the dismissals.69 The report determined “there was
significant evidence that political partisan considerations
were an important factor” in dismissal processes it described
61 80th Attorney General of the United States, appointed by President George
W. Bush in February 2005.
62 Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007,
at 10A. Gonzales further stated, “We have never asked a U.S. attorney
to resign in an effort to retaliate against him or her or to inappropriately
interfere with a public corruption case (or any other type of case, for that
matter).” Id.
63 See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Justice Dept. Politicizing
the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Preserving Prosecutorial
Independence].
64 The replacements were not subject to the 120-day limit due to a provision
of the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
Public Law No. 109-77 § 502 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546).
65 David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 726
(2008).
66 See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 63.
67 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weichs to Judiciary
Chairman John Conyers (July 21, 2010), https://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/files/assistant-ag-ronald-weichs-letter.pdf. Attorney General
Michael Mukasey appointed Nora R. Dannehy, the acting U.S. attorney in
Connecticut, to lead a criminal probe that ended in 2010. That investigation,
which was limited to the Iglesias termination, determined that while the
circumstances “be[spoke] undue sensitivity to politics on the part of DOJ
officials who should answer not to partisan politics but to principles of
fairness and justice” and “the actions of DOJ leadership were contrary to
DOJ principles,” no criminal charges were warranted. Id.
68 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF PROF. RESP., supra note
59.
69 Id. at 337.

as “arbitrary” and “fundamentally flawed.”70 Additionally, the
report noted the controversy “raised doubts about the integrity
of Department prosecution decisions.”71

D. Previous Proposals Regarding DOJ
Structure and Communications Between
DOJ and the White House
Proposals to insulate the DOJ from political interference have
included structural changes and regulation of communications
between the department and the White House.

1. Proposals for DOJ Structural Reform
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Senator Sam Ervin, who
chaired the select committee that investigated Watergate,
proposed legislation to create an independent DOJ. The
bill would have limited the president’s power to remove the
attorney general. Under this proposal the president would
appoint the attorney general to a six-year term, subject to
removal only “for good cause.”72 The attorney general would
then appoint the FBI director as well as the U.S. attorneys and
U.S. marshals for each judicial district.73
This proposal faced strong opposition, and 14 of 17 witnesses
testified that separating the DOJ from presidential control
would violate the separation of powers doctrine.74 Former
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, who concurred in this
assessment, opined that the greatest permissible protection
70 Id. at 325, 356.
71 Id. at 358. For example, the report found that U.S. Attorney for the District
of New Mexico David Iglesias was dismissed because of a desire among
New Mexico Republicans, including U.S. Senator Pete Domenici, “to
influence voter fraud prosecutions in a closely divided state [and] affect the
timing of a public corruption case against a prominent Democrat in order to
influence the outcome of an election.” Id. at 197.
72 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.
2803 and S. 2978, 93rd Cong. 3 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics].
Years later, Judge Griffith Bell, President Carter’s first attorney general,
prepared a memorandum advising on a definite term for the attorney
general only removable only for malfeasance. In the memo he concluded
the requested legislation was likely illegal and that “there is no method,
short of a constitutional amendment, to separate the Attorney General
from Presidential control.” Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney
General, 1 Op. O.L.C. 75 (1977).
73 Removing Politics, supra note 72.
74 Id. Witnesses included: Ted Sorenson, speechwriter and adviser to President
John F. Kennedy; Nicholas Katzenbach, one of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
attorneys general; and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.
Id. at III. The separation of powers doctrine reflects the constitutional
distribution of political authority among the three branches of government:
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. JOHN C. KNECHTLE & CHRISTOPHER
J. ROEDERER, MASTERING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 2015).
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against improper presidential actions was to appoint attorneys
general who are “capable of saying to a President, no, the
law does not permit this; I will not permit this; and you must
not engage in activities such as have been contemplated.”75
Other critics of the proposal questioned whether it was
desirable to have federal law enforcement removed from
democratic control and whether it was possible to remove
“politics from politics” to formulate and enforce a view of
“the law” independent of policy considerations.76 Voicing
his disagreement with the legislation, Ted Sorenson, one of
President Kennedy’s closest aides, argued:
Politics is necessarily tied up with policy, with one’s concept of
the public interest and response to the public will. A president
who campaigns on a “law and order” issue, or a narcotics or
civil rights or organized crime issue, must not be confronted
with an attorney general of sharply differing views appointed
for a fixed term by his predecessor.77

Other proposals also arose out of the Watergate scandal. For
example, former Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. proposed to divide the DOJ
by function.78 To him, the DOJ was flawed because of the
expectation that the attorney general “serve two masters, [the
president and the law,] at the same time.” Seymour therefore
proposed the creation of an Office of Chief Prosecutor, which
would direct “all of the existing civil and criminal litigation and
law enforcement functions in the Department of Justice.”79 This
new office would include the U.S. attorneys, and the president
would retain the power to appoint them based on lists prepared
by Circuit Nominating Commissions, comprised of appointees
of the chief judges of the constituent courts.80
75 Removing Politics, supra note 72, at 63.
76 CLAYTON, supra note 33, at 105.
77 Removing Politics, supra note 72, at 73. Sorenson further testified that “[l]
aw enforcement faces enough problems today without responsibility
for it at the federal level being divided between the president’s men and
the attorney general’s. Do not fragment that responsibility—fix it, on the
President, where it belongs. How else can a President be held responsible
for his own Constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed?” Id. at 19.
78 Id. at 216.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 218.

Proposals to restructure the DOJ have persisted.81 For example,
several commentators, including Bruce Einhorn82 and Garrett
Epps,83 have recently called for electing the attorney general.
Many states already hold elections for their attorneys general.84
Einhorn further proposed that the elected attorney general
would appoint the FBI director and other officers, subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate. Einhorn and Epps argue
that such “independent stewardship of the Justice Department
would act as a counterweight to any abuse of power by the
president or his political appointees.”85 While each of these
proposals suggests that the solution to improper interference is
to limit presidential authority by restructuring the DOJ, others
have responded to these same concerns with less extreme
proposals.

2. Proposals to Govern DOJ-White House
Communications
As a result of Watergate and the special prosecutor
investigation, White House and DOJ leadership since the Ford
administration have promulgated rules governing contact
regarding investigations and enforcement actions. All of
these policies share a set of common features: establishing
the White House Counsel’s Office and Office of the Attorney
General as primary gatekeepers for initial contact; restricting
communications based on function rather than personnel; and
requiring information to be important both for performance of
the president’s duties and appropriate from a law enforcement
perspective before any communication is condoned.86 The
81 Professor Jed Shugerman of Fordham Law School has proposed two
alternative schemas for enhanced independence: (1) requiring all major
departmental decisions be ratified by a commission comprised of both
senior agency officials still appointed and removed at will by the president
and independent directors of both parties with long statutory tenures only
severable for cause or (2) formally converting quasi-judicial offices within
the DOJ, like OLC, into independent agencies. Shugerman, supra note 4.
82 United States Immigration Judge, 1990-2007, Adjunct Professor of Law,
Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, California.
83 Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. See Garrett Epps,
Why We Should Make Attorney General an Elective Office, SALON (Mar. 7,
2007, 5:30 PM), https://www.salon.com/2007/03/09/attorney_general/;
Garrett Epps, Picking the People’s Lawyer, SLATE (June 4, 2012, 5:01 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_hive/2012/06/
fixing_the_constitution_electing_the_attorney_general_.html.
84 State Attorneys Generals, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, https://www.kff.org/
other/state-indicator/state-attorney-generals.
85 Bruce J. Einhorn, Time to Let the American People Elect the US Attorney
General, HILL (June 20, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/the-administration/338536-its-time-we-let-the-american-peopleelect-the-us.
86 Wright, supra note 4, at 49.
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number of parties permitted to communicate about pending
investigations has increased and decreased with each
administration.87
During the George W. Bush administration, the Gonzalez
op-ed and growing backlash against the 2006 U.S. attorney
terminations led the Senate Judiciary Committee to consider
legislation “to provide for limitations in certain communications
between the Department of Justice and the White House
Office relating to civil and criminal investigations.”88 The initial
Senate bill, Security from Political Interference in Justice Act
of 2007, would have required communications about ongoing
DOJ civil or criminal investigations to only include named senior
Justice Department and White House officials or those they
designate.89 The House released its own version of the bill,
creating a reporting requirement on communications between
the DOJ and the White House and prohibiting communications
by non-covered personnel.90 The Senate committee
subsequently adopted the House language but the bill never
passed Congress.91
After the Security from Political Interference in Justice Act
failed to pass Congress, Attorney General Michael Mukasey
unilaterally issued revised guidelines in December 2007
that significantly narrowed the list of those permitted to
communicate about ongoing matters.92 During the Obama
administration, Attorney General Eric Holder further restricted
87 See Wright, supra note 4. During the George W. Bush Administration,
Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzalez largely expanded
the list beyond prior limits. The Clinton-era policy only allowed seven
people to have initial contacts about pending cases—the president, vice
president, White House counsel, deputy White House counsel, attorney
general, deputy attorney general and associate attorney general. See Letter
from Attorney General Janet Reno to Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel
to the President (Sept. 29, 1994). Attorney General Ashcroft amended
the policy in 2002 to permit the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, Vice President, White House Counsel, National Security
Council and the Office of Homeland Security in their entireties, at least
417 people at the White House and 42 DOJ officials, to communicate on
non-national security related matters. See Memorandum from Attorney
General John Ashcroft for Heads of Department Components and United
States Attorneys (Apr. 15, 2002). Attorney General Gonzalez issued a
new memorandum in 2006 adding the Office of Management and Budget
as well as the Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Vice President to the list,
swelling those permitted to communicate with the DOJ about pending
investigations and cases to at least 895 people in the executive branch.
See Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys (May 4, 2006).
88 S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007).
89 Id.
90 See H.R. 3848, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).

permissible “initial communications”93 and reiterated that
the DOJ would only advise the White House on “pending or
contemplated criminal or civil investigations or cases when—
but only when—it is important for the performance of the
President’s duties and appropriate from a law enforcement
perspective.”94 A memorandum from Trump’s first White
House counsel, Donald F. McGahn, II, continued the Obamaera restrictions “to ensure that DOJ exercises its investigatory
and prosecutorial functions free from the fact or appearance of
improper political influence.”95
Support for various iterations of the Security from Political
Interference in Justice Act has recently reemerged. For example,
Protect Democracy proposed both codifying clear prohibitions
on improper interference and requiring reporting of irregular
contacts as priority interventions.96 Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) has also signaled support
for mandated reporting on communication.97 Finally, the
Brennan Center Task Force on Democracy and the Rule of Law,
which believes “Congress should not itself regulate how the
executive branch deals with law enforcement,”98 proposed
requiring the White House to publish policies on who can
contact agencies and to maintain a log of covered contacts.99

3. Proposals to Insulate U.S. Attorneys
Proposals to insulate U.S. attorneys existed prior to the
Watergate scandal and 2006 U.S. attorney dismissal incident.
For example, proposals to remove principal officers within the
DOJ from partisan politics and direct presidential control were
93 Initial communications were restricted to to the Attorney General and
Deputy Attorney General at DOJ and the Counsel and Principal Deputy to
the President, President and Vice President. Attorney General Eric Holder,
Communications with the White House and Congress, Memorandum for
Heads of Department Components & All U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009).
94 Id.; see also Memorandum from White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler
for All White House Staff (Mar. 23, 2012).
95 Memorandum from White House Counsel Donald F. McGahn, II for
All White House Staff (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000
96 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 31.
97 CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, TRUMP-PROOFING THE
PRESIDENCY: A PLAN FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS REFORM 38 (2018),
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/trump_proofing_
the_presidency.pdf.
98 NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 18 (2018).
99 Id.

91 See S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S. REP. NO. 110-203, at 7-8 (2007)
(detailing legislative context).
92 Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks Before the American
Bar Association (Aug. 12, 2008).
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initially introduced in 1924 by Assistant Attorney General John
Crim during President Warren G. Harding’s administration.100
Following Watergate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, a Democrat from
Texas, also introduced legislation that would have prohibited
any individual closely associated with the president, his or her
100 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Investigation of the Attorney
General, 68th Cong. (1924). These proposals were introduced in the wake
of the Teapot Dome scandal, which led to the conviction of President
Warren Harding’s secretary of the interior after he took bribes to lease
petroleum reserves at low rates. Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty
was investigated by Congress for his failure to investigate or prosecute
the individuals who bribed the interior secretary. CLAYTON, supra note 33, at
99. After the resignation of his predecessor James Howard McGrath, who
was investigated for committing tax fraud, Truman’s last attorney general,
James McGranery, similarly recommended Congress remove U.S. attorneys
and other subordinate DOJ officials from partisan politics by making them
part of the civil service. Investigation of the Department of Justice: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. (1952-1953).
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campaign, or the political party apparatus that had supported
his or her candidacy from serving in DOJ appointed offices
and made the attorney general responsible for appointment
and removal of United States attorneys.101 Though it passed
the Senate in 1977, this bill was defeated in the House.102
Alternatively, many scholars, like Sara Sun Beale,103 believe that
the president should retain the authority to appoint individuals
who share his or her priorities and remove those who fail to
follow those priorities.104
101 S. 3395, 93d Cong. (1975). See also 121 Cong. Rec. 33530 (1975).
102 S. 1682, 94th Cong. (1977).
103 Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School.
104 Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 431 (2009).

II. The Legality of Limiting Residential Influence Over
Criminal Law Enforcement
The president’s powers over the DOJ are rooted primarily in two
provisions of the Constitution’s Article II. The Executive Vesting
Clause105 is central to the president’s administrative control over
the DOJ while the Take Care Clause106 provides the basis for
limiting the president’s undue influence over DOJ prosecutions
and investigations by requiring the president act in good faith
while executing the law.107 Together, the clauses establish the
president’s preeminent role as the head of the executive branch
of the federal government, granting the president the ability to
shape law enforcement policies and supervise the conduct of
other executive branch officials.108 There is disagreement about
how, if at all, Article II operates to limit the president’s powers
as chief executive.109
The structure, history, and phrasing of the Take Care Clause
support tying the president’s exercise of presidential power
directly to the duties of his office.110 Based on this interpretation,
this report recommends three proposals to limit undue White
House interference in DOJ investigations and federal criminal
prosecutions. Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C provide a theoretical
framework for the proposals recommended in Part III and make
clear that these proposals are anchored in the structure, history,
and phrasing of the Take Care Clause. Part A argues that Article
II, through the Take Care Clause, provides the basis for limiting
presidential interference in DOJ investigations and prosecutions.
Part B explains that it is Congress, not the president, that may
determine how to carry the law into effect. Part C makes clear
that because prosecutors act quasi-judicially, they must perform
investigations impartially and without partisan motives.

A. A Duty to Take Care Does Not Mean
“Take Care of It Yourself”
The framers chose the language of the Take Care Clause to
address concerns about the scope of presidential power,
especially with respect to carrying out administrative functions.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Dr. James McClurg
expressed concerns over a phrase used in the “resolution
105 The Executive Vesting Clause states, “[t]he executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
106 The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
107 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, THE OATH AND THE OFFICE 16-18 (2018).
108 Wright, supra note 4, at 27-28.
109 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 8.
110 Id.

respecting the national executive” (“the Resolution”).111 The
Resolution proposed giving the president the “power to carry
into execution the National Laws,” and Dr. McClurg worried
about the scope of implied powers that could be construed
from the phrase.112 He suggested it might be necessary for
the Committee on Detail to “determine the means by which
the executive is to carry the laws into effect, and to resist
combinations [against the law].”113 The draft produced by the
Committee on Detail addressed Dr. McClurg’s concerns by
replacing the phrase “power to carry into execution the National
Laws” with the language found in the Take Care Clause,
requiring the president to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”114 By adopting the language of the Take Care Clause,
the framers limited the scope of presidential power.115
The Take Care Clause was inspired by the history of the
“faithful execution” of responsibilities by public and private
officeholders.116 At the time of the Constitution’s framing,
public and private officers were bound to “faithfully execute”
their responsibilities by a duty of fidelity.117 Historically, the
imposition of a duty of fidelity through the language of “faithful
execution” on officeholders served three basic purposes:
first, to ensure “true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful,
good faith, and impartial execution” of their responsibilities;
second, to prevent the abuse of discretion for the purposes of
misappropriating profits; and, third, to prevent officeholders
from acting outside the scope of their legal powers.118 In using
111 Id. at 66.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Wright, supra note 4, at 29.
116 See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, ‘Faithful
Execution’ and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2140 [hereinafter Faithful
Execution] (noting that Take Care Clause and Presidential Oath Clause both
share an element of faithful execution). See also U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
The “faithful execution” language also appears in the Presidential Oath. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
117 See Faithful Execution, supra note 116, at 2181 (noting that “the project of
fiduciary constitutionalism” needs to be “revised to accommodate the fact
that the fiduciary obligations entailed by the Faithful Execution Clauses
flow at least as much from the law of public office as they do from inchoate
private fiduciary law from England”).
118 Id. at 2118 (explaining that the duty of fidelity had three basic components:
(1) “faithful execution was repeatedly associated in statutes and other legal
documents with true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and
impartial execution of law or office”; (2) “the faithful execution duty was
often imposed to prevent officeholders from misappropriating profits that
the discretion inherent in their offices might afford them”; and (3) “the duty
was imposed because of a concern that officers might act ultra vires”).
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the language of faithful execution in Article II, the framers
incorporated the duty of fidelity119 into the Constitution so the
president, in exercising his or her executive power, would have
a constitutional obligation to eschew self-interested action,120
including actions motivated by partisanship.121 Thus, the
Constitution’s command that the president “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed” subordinates the president to the
law122 and prevents him or her from acting beyond the scope of
legal authority.123
The structure of Article II suggests the Executive Vesting Clause
limits the president’s executive powers to carrying out the
duties imposed on the president by the Take Care Clause.124
The president’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed” can only be carried out because the “executive
power” was vested in the presidency.125 The powers granted
to the president exist solely for the purpose of executing his
or her duties.126 The placement of the Take Care Clause in
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, among a variety of other
presidential duties,127 supports the understanding that the
president’s duty to “faithfully execute” the law imposes a limit
on the president’s executive authority by requiring the president
act in good faith while carrying the law into execution.128
119 See id. at 2188 (noting that the “substantive original meaning of faithful
execution” comprised “a no self-dealing restriction; a subordination of
the President to the laws, barring ultra vires action; and a requirement of
affirmative diligence and good faith.”).
120 See id. at 2120.
121 Admittedly, proving an individual’s subjective intent will be difficult, and the
distinction between actions motivated by self-interest and those motivated
by the “right” reasons will not always be easy to apply. Yet, given that the
president’s faithful execution duties may, among others, include “no-bad
faith, no self-dealing,” and the “impartial discharge of the duties of office,”
the president’s duty to refrain from self-interested action would encompass
the duty to avoid actions motivated by private political interests. See id. at
9-10, 38.
122 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
123 Wright, supra note 4, at 30.
124 Brettschneider, supra note 107, at 17.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 “He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
128 Article II, Section 2 articulates most of the president’s powers. The Take
Care Clause, however, is found in Article II, Section 3 alongside a variety of
other presidential duties. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 62.

B. Congress Can Set the Standard for
“Faithful Execution”
While revising the language of the Take Care Clause, the
framers also modified the language now found in the Necessary
and Proper Clause to empower Congress, not the president,
to supplement the powers of the federal government.129 The
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power
to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” any of the powers vested in the U.S.
government.130 The framers conferred onto the legislative
branch a power that was substantially similar to the “power
to carry into execution the National Laws,” a power that was
deliberately not granted to the president at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787.131 Thus, where a law is required to
supplement the powers of the federal government, it is
Congress, acting through the Necessary and Proper Clause, not
the president, that supplements that power and determines
how it is to be exercised.132
Through the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress plays a
significant role in determining how the president can “faithfully
execute” the laws. In Marbury v. Madison,133 the Supreme Court
discussed the degree to which Congress could control the
executive’s administrative function.134 The controversy reviewed
in Marbury arose when President Thomas Jefferson, shortly
after entering office, ordered Secretary of State James Madison
to withhold the judicial commission of William Marbury, a
last-minute appointee of outgoing President John Adams.135
In Marbury, the Court explained that executive officers can
potentially act in two different capacities: as agents of the
president and as agents of the law.136 Executive officers who
129 Id.
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
131 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 62. James Madison, a proponent of
the “carry into execution” language, believed the phrase would give the
president the power to execute the laws as well as the implied power to
define how the laws would be “carried into effect.” Id. at 65.
132 Id. at 67; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
588 (1952) (noting that “[t]he President’s order does not direct that a
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed
by the President.”). In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter noted that
“unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. The separation
of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to undefined
provisions in the frame of our government.” Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
133 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 56.
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exercise power legally vested in the president by law (i.e., by the
Constitution or Congress), either at the president’s command
or on his behalf, act as agents of the president.137 When
executive officers act pursuant to authority granted to them by
Congress, they act as agents of the law.138 Thus, an executive
officer adhering to statutorily created responsibilities, such as
a prosecutor deciding whether to commence a prosecution
against an individual based on legal criteria established by
Congress, acts as an agent of the law, and must do as the
law commands, the president’s direction notwithstanding.139
A prosecutor must, therefore, exercise prosecutorial discretion
on an individual basis independent of any direct presidential
command.

C. Prosecutors Are Controlled
Only by the Law
Prosecutors, who act “quasi-judicially,” must engage in objective
and non-partisan decision-making. The work of prosecutors
has been described as “quasi-judicial” because prosecutors are
expected to pursue justice independent of political concerns.140
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that
when executive officers have a duty to make decisions that
affect the liberty interests of individuals, the discharge of
that duty takes on a quasi-judicial character.141 Further, when
the liberty interests of an individual are at stake, due process
requires the government to follow fair and neutral procedures.142
For example, decisions made by criminal law enforcement
officials related to initiating investigations, seeking grand jury
indictments, dismissing or filing of charges, and offering plea
bargains require the government to follow fair and neutral
137 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-66; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 57.
138 Id. As used here, “an agent of the law” carries the same meaning as “officer
of the law” (the terminology originally used in Marbury). Marbury, 5 U.S.
at 166. We altered the terminology to avoid confusion, as in the modern
lexicon “officer of the law” is closely associated with police officers.
139 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 55-57. In Kendall v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that Congress could vest executive officials with
the power to act independently of the president—Congress may require
executive officials to answer to the law rather than the president: “There
are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive
department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President.
But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not
repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and
in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to
the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this
is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial
character.” Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838).
140 Can the President Control, supra note 4, at 23.
141 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see generally Goldberg
v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
142 See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.

procedures.143 These discretionary decisions affect individual
liberty interests and are made only after the prosecutor has
heard or reviewed relevant evidence and arguments.144
Because of the individual liberty interest at stake, the DOJ has
established a series of guidelines on prosecutorial discretion
to “promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial authority
and contribute to the fair, evenhanded administration of the
federal criminal laws.”145 The DOJ published these guidelines
recognizing that “the consequences for those accused of
criminal wrongdoing, crime victims, and their families whether
or not a conviction ultimately results.”146 These guidelines divide
the prosecutorial process into several stages, each of which is
governed by a unique set of criteria.147 For example, Title 9-27 of
the DOJ Guidelines sets forth the requirements for conducting
an investigation,148 grounds for commencing prosecution,149
the standards for pursuing charges,150 and the importance
143 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 23.
144 Id.; Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125 (1998).
145 DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.001, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-927000-principles-federal-prosecution.
146 Id.
147 Id. at § 9-27.
148 Id. at § 9-27.200 (“If the attorney for the government concludes that
there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed a federal
offense within his/her jurisdiction, he/she should consider whether
to: (1) Request or conduct further investigation; (2)Commence or
recommend prosecution; (3) Decline prosecution and refer the matter for
prosecutorial consideration in another jurisdiction; (4) Decline prosecution
and commence or recommend pretrial diversion or other non-criminal
disposition; or (5) Decline prosecution without taking other action.”).
149 Id. at § 9-27.220 (“The attorney for the government should commence
or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s
conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence
will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the
prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is
subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists
an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”).
150 Id. at § 9-27.230 (“In determining whether a prosecution would serve
a substantial federal interest, the attorney for the government should
weigh all relevant considerations, including: (1) Federal law enforcement
priorities, including any federal law enforcement initiatives or operations
aimed at accomplishing those priorities; (2) The nature and seriousness
of the offense; (3) The deterrent effect of prosecution; (4) The person’s
culpability in connection with the offense; (5) The person’s history with
respect to criminal activity; (6) The person’s willingness to cooperate
in the investigation or prosecution of others; (7) The person’s personal
circumstances; (8) The interests of any victims; and (9) The probable
sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.”); id. at
§ 9-27.260 (“In determining whether to commence or recommend
prosecution or take other action against a person, the attorney for the
government should not be influenced by: (1) The person’s race, religion,
gender, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, or political association,
activities, or beliefs; (2) The attorney’s own personal feelings concerning
the person, the person’s associates, or the victim; or (3) The possible
affect of the decision on the attorney’s own professional or personal
circumstances.”).
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of maintaining disinterestedness throughout the process.151
The DOJ Guidelines show that decisions related to criminal
law enforcement are the culmination of an agency decision
making process, which has immediate and appreciable legal
consequences.152 An individual’s due process rights therefore
limit the ability of government officials, even the president,
to interfere with the objective decision-making processes
associated with enforcement of criminal laws.153
Prosecutors are bound by their oath, even when multiple duties
come into conflict with one another. The laws, regulations, and
rules of professional conduct require federal prosecutors to
act as advocates for the executive branch, while also imposing
a duty to “seek justice.”154 This duty requires prosecutors
to ensure that defendants have fair and impartial trials.155
151 Id. at § 9-27.001.
152 See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
153 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 17.
154 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 CMT. 1; Bruce A. Green, Why
Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 625 (1999)
[hereinafter Seek Justice] (explaining that justifications for the duty to
seek justice could be rooted in the prosecutor’s power or the prosecutor’s
professional role as representative of the sovereign).
155 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereign whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt should not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.”). See, e.g., People v. Lee Chuck, 78 Cal. 317, 330 (Cal. 1889); Seek
Justice, supra note 154, at 613-14.
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In contrast to a lawyer practicing in the private sector, a
prosecutor must take into account the public interest,156
while simultaneously zealously advocating157 on behalf of the
executive branch.158 A significant tension may arise if federal
prosecutors are ordered by White House officials—including
the president—to act in a manner that is contrary to the public
interest. DOJ prosecutors may turn to their oath of office to
resolve this tension because, while they must act as advocates
for the executive branch, prosecutors cannot violate their own
oath to “support and defend the Constitution” and to “faithfully
discharge the duties of the office.”159
156 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88, Seek Justice, supra note 154, at 614.
157 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system”).
158 Michael I. Krauss, The Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History of the Hired Gun, 8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325 (2001). The identity of the government lawyer’s
client is contested. See Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities
of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1180-81 (2002) (noting
that to the question of who the government lawyer’s client is, “legitimate
potential answers” are “the government generally, the agency, the
President, the public interest—each of which describes a part of the
government lawyer’s role” and that the “identity of the client is inherently
indeterminate”); Seek Justice, supra note 154, at 633 (”A lawyer serving
in the role as criminal prosecutor is distinguished by the identity of the
client, the amount of authority delegated to the lawyer to act on behalf of
the client and the nature of the client’s interests and ends in the criminal
context.”).
159 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2016).

III. Reform Proposals
The following three proposals are designed to prohibit actions
motivated by personal animus or self-interest that are aimed at
influencing decisions related to the criminal law enforcement
process.160 The proposals are not intended to impede the
president’s right to set enforcement priorities and to intervene
in matters relating to core executive functions, such as
protecting the security of the United States from foreign threats.
Proposal 1 recommends that Congress enact legislation clearly
stating the president and White House officials cannot exercise
influence over any decision related to the investigation or
prosecution of any individual, except where a core executive
function is implicated. Proposal 2(a) recommends that
Congress enact legislation codifying the DOJ’s Justice Manual
guidelines related to investigations, prosecutions, and and
charging decisions in order to emphasize that prosecutors
must follow the law above all else. Proposals 2(b) recommends
Congress create duties for prosecutors in situations where
the president or other White House officials order them
to contravene their statutory duties. In those situations,
prosecutors should have duties to not resign and to report the
unlawful order. Proposal 3 recommends Congress empower the
Office of Government Ethics to gradually define the parameters
of non-financial conflicts of interest that require recusal of DOJ
employees from certain matters.

Reform Proposal 1: Specifically prohibit
the president from interfering in the law
enforcement function of the DOJ.
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting White
House officials, including the president, from requesting
or demanding, either directly or indirectly, any officer or
employee of the DOJ to commence, terminate, or otherwise
influence any investigation, prosecution, or charging decision
related to the criminal liability of a particular person, except
where the discharge of core executive functions, such as
defending against national security threats, makes such
actions permissible. The legislation should make clear that
while non-DOJ officials may not direct or interfere with
any criminal law enforcement process, such officials may
refer matters to the DOJ for investigation and, if necessary,
participate in DOJ prosecutions as witnesses.161
160 Preventing actions motivated by self-interest is consistent with the
president’s duty to see that the laws are “faithfully executed” as this
encompasses the principles of good faith and that, under the rule of law “no
man should be his own judge.” See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456 (1996).
161 This proposal is influenced by and substantially similar to a proposal put
forward by the organization Protect Democracy. See PROTECT DEMOCRACY,
supra note 4, at 31.

Proposal 1 specifically focuses on preventing White House
personnel from exercising any undue influence in the criminal
law enforcement process. Focusing on the acquired executive
function of criminal law enforcement, Proposal 1 creates a
clear line that the president and other White House officials
cannot cross. The proposal only targets the acquired functions
granted to the executive by Congress. Therefore, Congress
can direct how the president is to carry those functions into
effect.162 This proposal also preserves the president’s ability
to set law enforcement priorities.163 As the chief executive,
the president plays a legitimate role in prioritizing certain
categories of criminal law enforcement as a matter of public
policy.164 In setting enforcement priorities, the president weighs
a number of factors, such as resource constraints, conflicting
congressional mandates, and deterrence.165 But Congress may
appropriately limit the president’s ability to determine the
outcome of individual cases so long as the president’s power to
set enforcement priorities is retained.
While the president may continue to set enforcement priorities,
he may not interfere with federal investigations or criminal
prosecutions of specific individuals. In Morrison v. Olson, the
Supreme Court considered the validity of an independent
prosecutor appointed, pursuant to the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute
government officials for their roles in the Iran-Contra affair.166
The Court determined the Ethics in Government Act did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine because it did not
interfere with the core functions of the executive branch and
did not diminish the power of the executive branch.167 The
Supreme Court did not regard prosecutorial decision-making as
a core executive function. Instead, it supported the proposition
that prosecutorial decision-making is an acquired executive
function.168 A congressional mandate explicitly prohibiting
presidential and White House interference in specific criminal
162 See supra note 141.
163 See generally Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456.
164 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 6.
165 Enforcement of Immigration Law provides an illustrative example.
Immigration agencies have the ability to pursue approximately 400,000
deportation cases a year, roughly 4% of the undocumented population in
the U.S. While the law provides that persons without documentation are
subject to deportation, Congress has also mandated that certain classes
of aliens, such as those who have committed violent crimes, be prioritized
for deportation. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Homeland Security
Secretary, to Leon Rodriguez, Director U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (Nov. 20, 2014).
166 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1998).
167 Id. at 679, 691; Can the President Control, supra note 4, at 6.
168 See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1998).
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prosecutions is consistent with the holding in Morrison, so long
as the mandate does not prevent the president from performing
his or her core executive functions.169
The legislation should be modeled after 26 U.S.C. § 7217,
which was enacted in response to President Nixon’s use of the
International Revenue Service to target his political enemies.
Section 7217 prohibits certain executive branch officials,
including the president, vice president, and members of their
staffs from “request[ing], directly or indirectly, any officer
or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or
terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular
taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.”170
The legislation, however, should permit non-DOJ officials
to refer matters to the DOJ for possible investigation. If it
is determined that the matter referred to the DOJ warrants
criminal investigation, the DOJ may call upon the official who
made the referral to testify as a witness during the investigation
or prosecution.
Proposal 1 could raise concerns related to democratic
accountability and uniform enforcement of the law. Democratic
accountability concerns are raised whenever individuals
within the federal government are put beyond the control of
elected officeholders.171 Uniform enforcement concerns might
arise if prosecutors pursue different enforcement priorities.172
Both concerns are accounted for in Proposal 1. Democratic
accountability is preserved under Proposal 1 because the
proposal does not affect the president’s ability to remove
prosecutors.173
The president’s ability to set uniform enforcement priorities
or shift enforcement priorities in response to changing
circumstances would also be unaffected under Proposal 1. By
focusing on the process of prosecution rather than the policies
of prosecution, prosecutors would remain bound to follow the
president’s general enforcement directives.174 The president’s
ability to set enforcement priorities will allow him or her to
continue to “supervise and guide [the] construction of the
statutes under which [the DOJ] act[s] in order to secure that
unitary and uniform execution of the laws.”175
169 Id.
170 26 U.S.C. § 7217; PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 31.
171 See generally Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
172 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 24.
173 See generally Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
174 See ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27 (1976) (noting the distinction
between the “proper role of the political process in the shaping of legal
policies and the perversion of the legal process by political pressure”).
175 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see also Can the President
Control, supra note 4, at 53.
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Reform Proposal 2: Prohibit prosecutors
from acting on undue White House
directives related to specific criminal
matters and create a duty for prosecutors
not to resign in the face of unlawful White
House interference and to report any such
interference.
(a) Congress should enact legislation that codifies DOJ Justice
Manual guidelines related to investigations, prosecutions,
and charging decisions. The statutory expansion must
reinforce the prosecutor’s duty to faithfully execute the
laws by specifically stating that prosecutors, when making
decisions or exercising discretion related to specific
criminal prosecutions, are agents of the law and must do
as the law commands, instructions from the president or
other White House officials notwithstanding.176
(b) The congressional enactment should also clarify that
prosecutors have an affirmative duty not to resign if the
president or another White House official demands the
prosecutor take action that would violate his or her duties
under the law. Any prosecutor who receives an improper
command under this law must also report the command
to the DOJ’s Inspector General.

Proposal 2 aims to address instances in which a president or
another White House official issues orders or instructions that
put the prosecutor’s responsibility to advocate for the executive
into conflict with the prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice.”177
In such instances, Proposal 2(a) clarifies that prosecutors
cannot consider the order or instruction when making decisions
related to any phase of the criminal law enforcement process.
Title 9-27 of the DOJ’s Justice Manual recognizes several
unique stages of the criminal law enforcement process
and provides specific criteria to guide decisions related to
176 This reform would rely on the distinction made in Marbury, which the Court
further elaborated on in Kendall, where it stated,
But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that
department is under the exclusive direction of the president. Such a
principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed by
the president. There are certain political duties imposed upon many
officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under
the direction of the president. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that
congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may
think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected
by the Constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow
out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction
of the president.
Kendall, 37 U.S. at 610 (1838).
177 See supra Part II.

investigations, prosecutions, and the charging of offenses.178
This listing in the Justice Manual, and the Justice Manual as a
whole, are notable because they lend support to the proposition
that prosecutors execute a quasi-judicial function.179 This
proposition is further supported by the Justice Manual’s
preamble, where it notes that the commencement of criminal
enforcement proceedings against an individual can have severe
consequences on that individual’s liberty interests.180 Yet, courts
have held that violations of DOJ guidelines bear little legal
significance.181 Because the Justice Manual specifically provides
that it “does not create substantive or procedural rights
enforceable by others,” persons who fall victim to guideline
violations are left without judicial recourse.182 A congressional
enactment based on Proposal 2(a), that codifies the factors
specified in Title 9-27 of the Justice Manual,183 would link the
prosecutor’s quasi-judicial responsibilities to the statutory
powers of their office, thereby giving legal recourse to persons
who are improperly subjected to criminal law enforcement
processes.
Currently, 28 U.S.C. § 516 vests the power to conduct
investigations and litigation in officers of the DOJ, subject to the
direction of the attorney general. While the statute empowers
the DOJ to conduct investigations and litigation on behalf of
the federal government, it does not explicitly state that DOJ
officers and the attorney general must exercise these powers
independently of the president. Codifying the criteria specified
in Title 9-27 of the Justice Manual will clarify that DOJ officials
function as agents of the law when making decisions related to
the criminal law enforcement process and must therefore do
as the law commands, even if this means defying a presidential
directive.184
Proposal 2(b) calls for the attorney general and prosecutors, as
agents of the law, to refuse to uphold orders from White House
officials that seek to impede, influence, or interfere with a
178 See generally JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145.
179 Lynch, supra note 144.
180 See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145.
181 See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 484, 493 (8th Cir. 2001). See generally
Nichols v. Reno, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Busher, 817
F.2d 1409, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987). Cf. United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d
260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990).
182 See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145, at § 1-1.200.
183 See supra Part II.C.
184 See supra Part II.B.

criminal investigation.185 In the absence of a clear congressional
mandate, refusing to uphold an order could present a dilemma
for the attorney general or prosecutor. He or she may view
an attorney general’s or a prosecutor’s role as an agent of the
law as being in conflict with their role as an advocate for the
executive branch.186 The attorney general or prosecutor may
even be pressured into resigning if he or she refuses to obey
a presidential command.187 Congress must make clear that in
instances where an attorney general or prosecutor is ordered
to obstruct, impede, or interfere with a criminal investigation,
the attorney general or prosecutor has an affirmative duty not
to resign and must refuse to uphold the order.188 Furthermore,
the attorney general or prosecutor receiving the order should
be required to detail the matter in writing and explain why he or
she believes the president violated the duty to faithfully execute
the law. The attorney general or prosecutor must then transmit
the explanation to the DOJ’s inspector general, and possibly to
Congress, for an investigation.
Proposal 2 is likely to raise concerns about democratic
accountability and the president’s ability to respond to
widespread criminal conduct by changing enforcement
priorities. However, Proposal 2 maintains democratic
accountability by preserving the president’s ability to remove
prosecutors.189
185 See id. (“As defined by statute and precedent, the crime of obstruction
occurs when an individual ‘corruptly’ endeavors to impede or influence an
investigation or other proceeding, and the word ‘corruptly’ is understood to
mean ‘with an improper purpose.’”).
186 See supra Part II.C.
187 See supra notes 49-52.
188 See Faithful Execution, supra note 116, at 65 (“The seemingly discretionary
pardon power in Section 2 may similarly be curtailed by the duty of faithful
execution, prohibiting (at least) self-pardons. And it may also restrict the
President’s power to dismiss officials for primarily self-protective purposes
against the public interest, especially given that removal power is not
explicitly mentioned in the text while the requirement of faithful execution
is, doubly.”). Sally Yates, who considered President Trump’s ban on travel
from certain majority-Muslim nations to be illegal, wrote to DOJ attorneys
stating,
I am responsible for ensuring that the positions we take in court remain
consistent with this institution’s solemn obligation to always seek justice
and stand for what is right. At present, I am not convinced that the
defense of the Executive Order is consistent with these responsibilities
nor am I convinced that the Executive Order is lawful. Consequently, for
as long as I am the Acting Attorney general, the Department of Justice
will not present arguments in defense of the Executive Order, unless
and until I become convinced that it is appropriate to do so.
Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Attorney General (Jan. 30, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/document-Letter-FromSally-Yates.html.
189 See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 697-98.
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Additionally, Proposal 2 does not interfere with the president’s
ability to direct resources for criminal investigations. It is not
unreasonable to assume that situations may arise where
widespread criminal conduct may lead a president to request
that the attorney general take legitimate, robust action.190
For this reason, Proposal 2 is designed to protect prosecutors
from undue influence only when they are making criminal law
enforcement decisions related to specific individuals. As such,
Proposal 2 maintains the president’s power to shift general
enforcement priorities in response to changing circumstances
and requests proactive investigatory action from the DOJ when
it relates to widespread criminal activity.191

Reform Proposal 3: Mandatory recusal for
DOJ employees and officials where private
and personal considerations conflict with
the public interest.
Congress should enact legislation mandating DOJ officials
report to the Office of Governmental Ethics (“OGE”) all
personal or private interests that might conflict with the
public interest when they are involved with any aspect of the
criminal law enforcement process. Further, the legislation
should mandate that DOJ officials must recuse themselves
from all aspects of a relevant case when the OGE has
determined personal or private interests pose a “significant
risk” to public interest. Congress should permit the OGE to
interpret the term “significant risk.”

Proposal 3 is designed to allow the OGE to gradually determine
what type of non-financial conflicts of interest might interfere
with the prosecutor’s duty to the public interest. Prosecutors
are required to support and defend the Constitution while also
seeking justice in an impartial fashion.192 Because prosecutors
190 See Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 13. See also Barack Obama,
The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811,
823 (2017) (“[P]articular criminal matters are not directed by the President
personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement
officials who are dedicated to serving the public and promoting public
safety. The President does not and should not decide who or what to
investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should
happen.”).

make decisions that affect defendants while also accounting
for the public interest, a prosecutor may be deemed to have
a fiduciary duty to the public.193 Adhering to their duty to the
public requires prosecutors to neither further their own personal
interests nor to further the private interests of others.194
Thus, in instances when a prosecutor is acting pursuant to
a presidential order and commences a criminal proceeding
against the president’s political adversaries, not only does the
president violate his or her fiduciary duty for ordering such a
prosecution,195 the prosecutor also violates his or her duty to
seek justice in a disinterested fashion.196 In such an instance,
the prosecutor violates his or her duty to the public interest
because the law enforcement process was motivated by the
private interests of the president.197
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct state that a conflict of interest exists where there is a
“significant risk” that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend,
or carry out an appropriate course of action for his or her
client will be “materially limited” as a result of the lawyer’s
other responsibilities or interests.198 The Commentary on
the Model Rules states that determining what constitutes a
“significant risk” is not dependent on “[t]he mere possibility of
subsequent harm” to the lawyer’s client. Instead, the focus is
on “the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate”
and whether those interests will “materially interfere with the
lawyer’s independent professional judgment” in considering
alternatives or pursuing reasonable courses of action on behalf
of the client.
Defining non-financial conflicts of interest that pose a
“significant risk” to prosecutors’ ability to act in the public
interest does present some difficulties. Because prosecutors
function within a bureaucratic governmental institution, a
prosecutor’s conflict could arise out of “any personal belief,
ambition or institutional interest” that undermines the
prosecutor’s ability to conduct prosecution in a disinterested
manner.199 At the federal level, conflict of interest guidelines
have rarely ventured beyond defining the scope of financial
193 See supra Part II.C.

191 See Barack Obama, President, United States of America, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 24, 2012) (“I’m asking my Attorney General to create a
special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to
expand our investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky
mortgages that led to the housing crisis”).

194 See Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 192, at 471-72.

192 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814
(1987); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of
Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 471 (2017) [hereinafter Rethinking Prosecutors’
Conflicts].

198 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt.
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195 See Faithful Execution, supra note 116, at 9-10.
196 See Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 192, at 471-72.
197 Id.
199 See id.

and legal conflicts of interest.200 Additionally, disciplinary
authorities at both the state and federal level have been
unwilling to directly address what amounts to a non-financial
or institutional conflict of interest.201 For example, a federal
appeals court rejected a grievance filed against Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr alleging that Starr’s ties to conservative
Republicans compromised his ability to remain disinterested
while investigating Democratic President Bill Clinton’s role in
the Whitewater scandal.202 In rejecting the claim, a concurring
200See Sadie Gurman & Aruna Viswanatha, Matthew Whitaker, a Critic of the
Mueller Investigation, Now Oversees It, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2018, 7:02 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-gets-ready-for-matthewwhitaker-at-justice-department-1541699792 (“Federal ethics regulations
governing the Justice Department are more generally focused on financial
or legal conflicts of interest, rather than past commentary.”).
201 See In re Members of State Bar of Ariz., v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, No. 092293 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2011); Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 192, at
485-87 (noting that other than a disciplinary proceeding against a county
attorney and his deputy for a conflict of interest arising from personal
animosity, “it is uncertain whether any prosecutors other than these two
in Arizona have ever been publicly disciplined for prosecuting a case on
the ground that purely subjective motivations such as antipathy toward a
political rival may have undermined disinterestedness”).
202 See Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1998); Rethinking
Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 192, at 485-88; David Jackson, Complaint
Against Starr is Sent to Judge, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1997.

judge noted that a court’s application of “vague standards such
as political conflict of interest” would result in politicization of
the judiciary and further “weaken legitimate efforts to weed
out” misconduct in the government.
Despite these difficulties, Congress should enact legislation
requiring all DOJ officials to report any personal or private
interests that might conflict with the public interest when they
are involved with any aspect of criminal law enforcement. The
legislation should mandate that any person whose interests
are deemed to be a “significant risk” by the OGE must recuse
himself or herself from involvement with the case at hand.
The OGE should define “significant risk” through rulemaking
and case-by-case adjudication. Allowing the OGE to define
“significant risk” through rulemaking and adjudications will
allow the agency to develop appropriate standards over time
while also permitting the agency to adjust the definition as
needed.203
203 See generally S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (finding that if
given the proper statutory authority, agencies may adopt new standards
through individual orders based on individual adjudications).

Conclusion
The Watergate scandal led to the downfall of President Nixon,
but not America’s constitutional democracy. Instead, Watergate
initiated a series of reforms that not only strengthened our
institutions, but also established new norms designed to guide
the ethical judgments of government actors. The current
moment, which has drawn comparisons to the Watergate era,
presents another opportunity for exploring the deficiencies and
clarifying misunderstandings in the law.

The reforms in this report would strengthen our nation’s
institutions and the obligations of legal professionals to serve
as a check on the president’s powers. It is not unusual for a
president to attempt to expand the boundary of executive
power. However, when a president attempts to expand his or
her executive power, scholars and the public should evaluate
whether such an increase in executive power is in the best
interest of the nation.
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